



U.S. Department  
of Transportation

Federal Aviation  
Administration

# EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

Aircraft Certification Service  
Washington, DC

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DATE: December 5, 2000  
2000-25-52

Send to all U.S. owners and operators of MD Helicopters, Inc. Model 369A, H, HE, HM, HS, D, E, FF, and 500N helicopters.

This superseding Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) is being issued to correct an error in the applicability section of Emergency AD 2000-24-51 that was issued on November 21, 2000. That Emergency AD was prompted by a main rotor blade (blade) failure due to fatigue cracking that originated at corrosion pits on the spar bonded surfaces, resulting in an accident that destroyed a Hughes Model 369D helicopter. That condition, if not detected, could result in failure of a blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Since the issuance of Emergency AD 2000-24-51, the FAA discovered an error in the applicability section. The part numbers are not listed correctly with the appropriate serial numbers and, as a result, the FAA has received requests from operators to clarify which blade part numbers are affected since the emergency AD deviates from the applicable service bulletin. The intent of Emergency AD 2000-24-51 was not to deviate from the part numbers and serial numbers listed in the service bulletin. To assure affected blades are correctly identified, the FAA is superseding Emergency AD 2000-24-51 to correct the applicability. The requirements for accomplishing the intent of the emergency AD remain the same.

The FAA has reviewed Helicopter Technology Company, LLC, Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 2100-2R2, dated November 14, 2000 (SB), which describes procedures for performing a one-time inspection of each blade for skin-to-spar bonding voids before further flight.

We have identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other MD Helicopters, Inc. Model 369A, H, HE, HM, HS, D, E, FF, and 500N helicopters of these same type designs. Therefore, this AD requires, before further flight, performing a tap inspection on both the upper and lower surfaces of each blade. If any voids are detected that exceed specified inspection requirements, this AD requires replacing the unairworthy blade with an airworthy blade before further flight. The actions are required to be accomplished in accordance with the SB described previously.

This rule is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt of this emergency AD.

**2000-25-52 MD HELICOPTERS, INC.:** Docket No. 2000-SW-63-AD. Supersedes Emergency AD 2000-24-51, Docket No. 2000-SW-62-AD.

**Applicability:** Model 369A, H, HE, HM, HS, D, E, FF, and 500N helicopters, with main rotor blade (blade), part number (PIN) 500P2100-BSC (serial number (SIN) with a prefix of "K" and 101 through 562); PIN 500P2100-101 or *PIN* 500P2100-301 (*SIN* with a prefix of "A" and 001 through 999 or S/N with a prefix of "B" and 001 through 529), or blade, PIN 500P2300-501 (*SIN* with a prefix of "T" and 101 through 107), manufactured by Helicopter Technology Company, LLC, installed, certificated in any category.

**NOTE 1:** This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AP. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required before further flight, unless accomplished previously.

To detect a void in the bonding that could result in a crack due to corrosion pits on the blade spar bonded surfaces, failure of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:

(a) Perform a tap inspection on both the upper and lower surfaces of each blade in accordance with the "INSPECTION" paragraph of Helicopter Technology Company, LLC, Mandatory Service Bulletin Notice No. 2100-2R2, dated November 14, 2000 (SB). If any voids on a blade are detected that exceed specified inspection requirements of the SB, replace the unairworthy blade with an airworthy blade before further flight.

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office.

**NOTE 2:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(d) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Helicopter Technology Company, LLC, 12923 South Spring St., Los Angeles, CA 90061, telephone (310) 523-2750, fax (310) 523-2745.

**(e) Emergency AD 2000-25-52, issued December 5, 2000, becomes effective upon receipt.**

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Marc Belhumeur, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170, telephone (817) 222-5.177, fax {817) 222-5783,

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on December 5,2000.

Henry A. Armstrong, Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service